Anecdotal evidence from the British Railway Mania and other historical financial bubbles suggests that many investors during such episodes are naive, thus contributing to the asset price boom. Using extensive investor records, we find that very few investors during the Railway Mania can be categorized as such. Some interpretations of the Mania suggest that naive investors were expropriated by railway insiders, but our evidence is inconsistent with this view as railway insiders contributed substantial amounts of capital, and their investments performed no better than those made by other experienced investors.
Fourthly, we examine railway insiders, who were either directors of established railways, or who were on the provisional committees of the projected railways.
Our main data sources are the lists of individuals who subscribed to new railway companies, and shareholder lists of one of the established railways, the Great Western Railway. Both of these sources provide information on the occupation and location of investors. We also use contemporaneous shareholder lists from the banking sector to ascertain the extent to which railway investors were novices. Finally, we use stock price data to determine whether or not certain investor characteristics were correlated with first-day investment returns and long-run success.
We find that experienced investors contributed a large proportion of capital.
Businesspeople, investors with previous investment experience, investors from the railway's locality, railway directors and provisional committee members were all active in providing capital. In terms of investment performance, our evidence suggests that businesspeople and investors from the railway's locality invested in projects which had higher returns, whereas inexperienced investors tended to invest in projects which provided lower returns. Investments made by railway insiders did not perform as well as those made by other experienced groups, which may partially absolve them of acting in an opportunistic way during the Mania.
One of the broader implications of this paper is that the role played by inexperienced investors during asset price booms may not be substantial. This implies that we have to look elsewhere for the causes of asset price booms, and we cannot dismiss such periods as simply being the product of irrationality and naivety. Our findings also imply that bubbles are not necessarily an attempt by insiders to expropriate others. The biggest winners during the Railway Mania were those with experience, rather than inside knowledge, and attempts to hold insiders culpable for the development of a bubble may be misplaced.
As well as adding to our knowledge of investors during asset price booms, this paper augments the growing literature on investor characteristics in the Victorian equity market. 8 Although we know quite a lot about bank investors across the nineteenth century, our knowledge of railway investors is largely confined to the pre-Mania period. 9 The Railway Mania and the Primary Market for Railway Shares
The first modern passenger railway in Britain, the Liverpool and Manchester railway, opened in 1830. Following its success, new railway companies were promoted during the mid-1830s, with Parliament authorizing fifty-nine new railways, having about £36.4 million of capital. 10 After this flurry of activity, railway promotion was effectively dormant until 1843. In 1843, there were sixty-three applications to Parliament, followed by 199 applications in 1844, and by the end of 1845 there were another 562 applications. 11 In addition, there were many projected companies that did not even reach the point of applying to Parliament, with The Times estimating that there were 1,263 new projects in 1845. If a group of individuals wanted to set up a railway company, they had to deposit a detailed application for a railway Bill with parliament in the November prior to the parliamentary session. Part of the parliamentary submission included a subscription contract, containing the names, addresses, and occupational details of shareholders who had paid up 10 percent, and who had jointly undertaken to provide 75 percent of the company's capital. 13 To attract investors, promoters would issue a prospectus, usually in the press, and invite applications to be made. 14 These prospectuses generally contained details regarding the amount of capital being raised, the deposit required, members of the provisional committee, the proposed route, the advantages of the scheme, and lists of stockbroker offices where applications for shares could be made. 15 Applicants in the 1840s usually had to provide a reference as to their standing along with their application. 16 If an application was successful, shares were then allotted (or allotted on a pro rata basis in the case of oversubscription) to applicants. At this point, they had to pay the 10 percent deposit on the shares, and in return they received a scrip certificate-this entitled the bearer to a stipulated number of shares if the company successfully obtained a Bill and was incorporated. The original allottees were liable for all future calls should the company be successfully incorporated, and before that time, they were liable unlimitedly for all debts incurred by the company.
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Although scrip certificates could not be legally traded, an active market arose for railway scrip because certificates were made out to bearer and could therefore be easily transferred without fear of legal penalty. 18 However, original holders of scrip may have been reluctant to sell their scrip as they remained legally liable for all debts of the company until it was incorporated. 19 In addition, the buyers of scrip were in a dubious legal position if they wanted to recover losses from the promoters. 20 
Data on Investors during the Mania
One of the key features of the Mania was the promotion of over one thousand new railway lines, so the examination of who subscribed the initial capital for such projects can give a particularly useful insight into who made the promotion boom possible. The absence of most extant shareholder lists and share registers also means that subscription contracts are one of the only sources of information we have on who invested during the Mania. 21 Indeed, in the case of the Railway Mania, it has been suggested that subscription contracts may provide a greater insight than shareholder records into the "fever of speculation which gripped the middle classes in 1845." 22 One potential weakness with subscription lists is that the majority of subscribers could have quickly sold their scrip or shares to others during the Mania, and it is really these buyers who we should be interested in if we want to understand who invested during the Mania. 23 However, it was well known at the time that those who made the largest profit during the Mania were subscribers rather than those who purchased shares on the secondary market. 24 In addition, railway directors, who essentially allotted shares, may have had a preference for permanent investors rather than temporary speculators. 25 In April 1845, Parliament printed an alphabetical list of subscribers to railway schemes along with their description, addresses, railways they had invested in, and the amount of capital they had subscribed. 26 This list is 539 pages long, and contains all the subscribers to 209 railway contracts that had been deposited in the year before November 1844. Similarly, in April 1846, Parliament printed a list of all persons who had subscribed £2,000 or more to any railway subscription that had been deposited in the year before November 1845. 27 This list is 320 pages long and contains subscribers of £2,000 or more to 556 railways. In other words, between the two subscription lists, we can identify all those who subscribed to new railway ventures in the run-up phase of the Mania, and all large subscribers who invested whenever the Mania was close to or at its peak.
The two parliamentary lists of railway subscribers were criticized at the time because it was alleged that they contained fictitious characters, placed there by the promoters to increase the respectability of the subscription list, and impecunious stags who applied for shares in new railways using false addresses. 28 However, periodicals at the time did not question their authenticity. 29 More importantly, a parliamentary report into the subscription list of the London and York Railway found that out of 1,101 subscribers, only four were fictitious in that the subscriber had given a false address, name or socio-occupational description. 30 The parliamentary committee's conclusion was that the petitioner (a vice-chairman of a rival railway) was vexatious, and was simply interested in hindering the progress of the London and York railway through parliament. 31 Notably, the aspersions he cast resulted in the London and York railway not being authorized by Parliament. 32 Consequently, one would assume that subscription lists (particularly companies authorized by Parliament) did not contain too many fictitious or fraudulent individuals as such weaknesses could be used by opponents to prevent a railway company being authorized by Parliament.
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It is highly unlikely that nominees were numerous in the subscription lists as it was a costly and sophisticated legal device out of the reach of most individuals. 34 For example, the inquiry into the subscription list of the London and York railway suggests that only five subscribers out of 1,101 may have been nominees.
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A further potential problem with subscription lists as an information source is that they may reveal more about the preferences of promoters for a reputable as well as local shareholder body rather than the preferences of investors per se. 36 Although there is not much evidence of favoritism on the part of promoters, they may have wanted to ensure a reputable and local shareholder body so as to convince parliamentarians of the merits of their proposal. 37 This may explain why subscribers had to provide their sociooccupational status as well as a reference when applying for railway shares. 38 However, the providing of references became little more than a matter of form during the Mania.
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In addition, such was the number of railway schemes before Parliament that close scrutiny of subscriber lists would have been very costly. Indeed, it has been observed that the success of schemes had more to do with luck rather than anything intrinsic about the scheme or the list of subscribers.
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Business and Political Experience
To assess whether investors were experienced in business, or had superior knowledge of the Parliamentary authorization process for railway schemes, we examine the occupations of investors, using the description given in the Parliamentary subscription lists. We acknowledge that occupational status may be a blunt tool for determining experience as some women investors or others we classify as being inexperienced may have been very knowledgeable, and some individual businesspeople or railway directors may have had little business understanding as such. However, on average, we believe that occupational categories are reasonably good indicators of experience, and contend that it is useful to place investors on a spectrum with regards to their experience of business and politics based on their occupation.
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Although an individual may have exaggerated their status, it was in the selfinterest of railways to ensure that it was accurately reported. A small proportion of investors do not have an occupational description, and in the very small number of cases where there is joint ownership, the occupation of the first-named investor was recorded.
Many of the occupational categories are self-explanatory, but several occupations were 8 grouped into broader categories.
42
Many investors were described as gentlemen or esquires in the Parliamentary lists; these were mainly unoccupied men living off rental income. Although these titles may have been courtesy ones, it is unlikely that unoccupied men who were not from this social class were automatically labeled as such:
the inclusion of investors in the lists with no description would suggest that this was not the case. 43 Women investors who reported an occupation or a noble social status were assigned to the relevant socio-occupational category. Other women investors were selfreported in the subscription lists as either widows or spinsters. These self-designations tell us little about their social status, but they may indicate that these individuals were excluded from others means of financial support. To ascertain whether Mania investors were novices, we match all railway investors from Scotland with the list of Scottish bank shareholders. The process of matching these two lists required that an individual have the same name, description, and address in both lists. This approach results in a potentially large underestimation of the number of railway subscribers who were also bank shareholders because occupations in one list may have been specific whereas in the other they were generic; individuals with commonly-occurring surnames and descriptions (i.e., merchant or gentleman) whose address was just reported as Edinburgh or Glasgow have been excluded as we cannot determine whether or not they were the same individual; it may have been commonplace for businesspeople to give their business address in the list of bank shareholders and their home address in the subscription lists.
Given the above underestimation problems, it is notable that 30.6 percent of railway subscribers who lived in Scotland were also holders of Scottish bank shares, and these individuals contributed 43.9 percent of total railway capital subscribed by Scottish investors. The severity of the underestimation problem is illustrated by the fact that only 45.2 percent of bankers who subscribed to railways held bank shares. This is an extremely unlikely scenario as bankers typically held shares in their own banks.
We also obtained shareholder records for the Sheffield and Hallamshire Banking
Company, which enabled us to determine who had invested in its shares in the period from its inception in 1836 to 1845. 49 This bank was one of three banks in Sheffield at the time, and was similar to other Sheffield banks in that there were very close links between it and industry, with the result that the Sheffield manufacturing and mercantile classes dominated the shareholding constituencies of these banks. 50 Using the same matching approach as in the Scottish case above, we estimate how many individuals from Sheffield invested in railways and had invested in this bank between 1836 and 1845. There were five hundred individuals from Sheffield who invested during the Mania, and ninety of these investors had invested in the shares of the Sheffield and Hallamshire bank. These ninety investors subscribed 24.4 percent of railway capital in Sheffield. These are remarkably high figures given that there were two other joint-stock banks in Sheffield.
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In addition, shares in Sheffield banks were almost exclusively held by businesspeople, implying that a lot of non-business railway investors would have been excluded from holding them. 52 We also ascertained which Great Western Railway (GWR) shareholders in 1843 went on to subscribe to new railways during the Mania. Our analysis suggests that 473 GWR shareholders (23.5 percent) went on to subscribe to new railways and these investors contributed 3.6 percent of capital during the Mania. As these investors would have had experience of how railways were constructed, financed, and operated, they cannot be regarded as naive or inexperienced. If a similar proportion of investors in other established railways went on to invest in new projects, the contribution of capital during the Mania by such individuals would have been substantial.
Consideration of each of these sources of previous investment experience
suggests that a substantial proportion of investors had invested in the equity market prior to the Mania. This implies that these investors would have been familiar with the risk and returns that were associated with stock market investments.
Knowledge Based on Geography
Prior to the Mania, the important sources of railway capital were the Northwest (primarily Lancashire), London, and Yorkshire. 53 One would therefore expect that investors residing in these regions had extensive experience of railway investment prior to the Mania as they had actually witnessed the success of railways in their locality. As can be seen from Figure 2 , the vast majority of investment during the Mania came from these three regions, with close to 60 percent of subscribed capital and over 50 percent of investors coming from these three regions.
London becomes a slightly more important source of railway capital during the
Mania than it had done beforehand, with 20.7 percent of Mania investors living in
London. 54 This may suggest that the capital market had become a national one, with investors naively giving funds to companies of which they had little knowledge.
However, somewhat countering this, London investors, on average, invested more in railways than investors from other regions, with the result that 29.9 percent of subscribed capital was from London. 55 Indeed, close to one-third of the top percentile of investors are from London, and these 110 investors subscribed one-third of total capital during the Mania, implying that the London elite were heavily involved during the Mania and not just after the market had reached its nadir. These results confirm that a substantial proportion of investment came from regions which were established providers of capital, whilst another major proportion was local in nature. Both of these findings lend to support the view that many investors were not inexperienced in that they had relevant geographical knowledge and experience.
Railway Insiders
It could be argued that the strongest form of knowledge and experience would be As can be seen from Table 3 , provisional committee members were substantial investors in schemes which they promoted as well as other schemes. Provisional committee members provided 18.5 percent of total capital in the railway schemes which they helped promote and 32.4 percent of total capital in all railway schemes. On average, the investors in Table 4 were in 1.4 provisional committees and invested in 1.1 other railway schemes.
The majority of the 2,058 provisional committee members were merchants and manufacturers (36.0 percent) and gentlemen (31.7 percent). Legal professionals, bankers, and politicians were also well represented on provisional committees. Unsurprisingly, so-called inexperienced investors were not members of provisional committees, and members of the middle classes were not well represented either.
Directors of established railways, who mostly were either businessmen or gentlemen, were substantial investors in new railway schemes, with many of them being amongst the top percentile of investors during the Mania. Overall, directors of established railways contributed 15.3 percent of total capital during the Mania. In addition, close to one quarter of directors who invested during the Mania were also on the provisional committees of new schemes.
The above evidence suggests that a substantial proportion of funds for railway schemes during the Mania came from railway insiders, suggesting that a large proportion of investment came from individuals with extensive knowledge of the railway industry.
In addition, the level of investments made by these insiders suggests that they did not act in an opportunistic fashion during the Mania as they had a major stake in the success of the new railway schemes.
Investors and Investment Success
In this section, we examine the relationship between investor characteristics and the performance of their investment in order to ascertain whether investor experience and insider knowledge translated into superior investment performance. We measure performance by the price/par ratio enjoyed by a railway security on the first day it is quoted on the market. 59 This measures the gain to the original subscriber as many of the first-day prices were for scrip rather than shares. As can be seen from Figure 1 , most of the return earned on new railway schemes was generated by its first-day return, suggesting that initial subscribers enjoyed the bulk of returns. Indeed, a contemporary investment expert highlighted the effect of first-day returns, suggesting that first-day returns of 100 percent were to be expected. 60 We measure long-run success of an investment in a railway by using the price/par ratio on the last day for which a security is quoted.
In essence, what we are attempting to measure with this variable is the success or otherwise of railway companies in the longer run. Our basic premise is that less successful schemes will have lower price/par ratios on the last day its shares trade. As the vast majority of railway companies established during the Mania were not independent companies by the end of the 1840s, this last price observation for most companies is the last price quoted before the company either merged with another company or leased its line to another company or was wound up.
For the few companies that survived to 1850, we use the last price/par ratio of that year as a measure of long-run performance. Even though the original investor may have sold their stocks at this point, we are essentially asking whether or not they invested in a railway that proved to be successful in the longer run.
The price/par ratios were obtained from various issues of the Railway Times. We then regress the investor characteristics for each individual investment on the first and last day price/par ratio for each individual investment. We also control for the size of the investment, the fraction of capital called up, and the year the investment was made.
As can be seen from There is some evidence of those with legal experience earning higher returns but, apart from specification 9 in Table 4 , which is based on a smaller sample, investments made by politicians do not perform any better than those made by other investors. This would suggest that their knowledge of the authorization process did not necessarily bestow them with greater insider information. This finding would also appear to partially absolve MPs from claims that they acted in an opportunistic manner during the Mania.
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The positive and significant coefficient on the local variable in Table 4 implies that investments made by local investors performed better than those made by non-local investors, suggesting that the superior information of local investors enabled them to invest in better performing railway stocks. It also appears from An alternative explanation is that directors used their extensive knowledge of the industry to avoid investing in "bubble" companies that earned high first-day returns. Table 5 reveals the extent to which investor characteristics correlate with the long-run success of a new railway scheme. On the whole, the results parallel those found in Table 4 , with businesspeople being more likely than women and inexperienced investors to invest in railways which were more successful in the long run and local investors being more likely to invest in more successful railway schemes. However, two interesting results emerge from Table 5 . First, provisional committee members were more likely to invest in railways which were less successful in the long run, which implies that they did not have superior information than other investors, and they may even have invested for reasons other than earning a financial return on their investment.
Second, directors of the established railways were more likely to invest in railway schemes that were more successful in the long run, implying that they had superior information on the long-run success of new railway schemes.
Established Railways
The results in the previous section are interesting in so far as they allow us to examine the relative success of investors in choosing between assets. However, during an asset price reversal it is also important to consider the relative performance of investors in choosing when they enter and exit the market. This is the only company we were able to locate that had surviving records listing the identity of its shareholders at different points in time throughout the course of the Mania. It is also one of only a few railways which was not reorganized as a result of amalgamations, meaning the same classes of shares traded continuously during the period. Notably, as can be seen from Figure 1 , the asset price reversal experienced by the GWR was similar to the market as a whole.
The three shareholder lists that we analyze are the holders of £100 and £20 shares from February 1843, 1845, and 1848. 64 Although the GWR also had £50 shares in this period, the shareholder records for this class in 1845 have not survived. Nevertheless, the holders of £100 and £20 shares constituted the vast majority of the company's stockholders, and owned 72 percent of the company's equity capital in 1845. Table 6 reveals that the profile of investors in the GWR is broadly similar to that found in the subscription lists of new schemes. The business and upper classes are again the biggest contributors, with gentlemen being relatively more important. There were, however, a higher proportion of women investors in the GWR compared to the new railways, and this proportion increased slightly over the course of the Mania. However, these findings do not imply that GWR investors were inexperienced; it more likely reflects the fact that this railway was paying a dividend of eight percent in 1845, which made it attractive to male and female rentiers. 65 Consistent with this finding, a contemporary investment guide recommended that those looking for immediate income should invest on the established lines, whereas those looking for long-term capital gains should focus on the new railways. 66 The location of investors also follows a similar pattern to that of the new railways, with investors from London and Lancashire, and local investors from Gloucestershire, providing most of the capital.
There is also evidence of railway insiders holding shares in the GWR. Using the Railway Directory to identify directors, we found that as well as each of the GWR's fourteen directors holding shares in the company, directors of other railways also held GWR shares. The numbers of railway directors holding shares in the GWR were as follows: forty-seven in 1843, forty in 1845, and thirty-four in 1848.
By analyzing which investors were present in each of the years, it is possible to determine during which period individuals entered and exited their investments in GWR shares. Using share price and dividend data, this information can be used to determine which investors gained and lost from their investments.
Indices of capital gains and total returns have been calculated to estimate the returns to GWR shareholders during the Railway Mania, as shown in Figure 1 made it more or less likely that an investor was in a particular group other than the gainer group. More specifically they reveal the impact that a change in an independent variable will have on the log of the ratio of the probability of being in a particular group compared to the probability of being in the gainer group. For example, the 0.413 coefficient on the women dummy variable in column 2 of Table 8 can be calculated and interpreted as follows. After controlling for other factors, for a woman (when the dummy variable equals 1) the probability of losing is 0.506, and the probability of gaining is 0.219, therefore the ratio of losing to gaining is 2.307, and the log of this ratio is 0.836. For a man (when the dummy variable equals 0) the probability of losing is 0.417, and the probability of gaining is 0.273, therefore the ratio of losing to gaining is 1.527, and the log of this ratio is 0.423. The impact of being a woman (when the dummy variable moves from zero to one) is calculated as the difference in the logs of the ratios, namely 0.836 minus 0.423, which gives the coefficient value of 0.413. The significance of the coefficient indicates that we can be confident in the result, namely that being a woman increases the probability of losing rather than gaining.
From Table 8 , we see that women and inexperienced investors were more likely to be losers rather than gainers, whereas the reverse is true for merchants, the business classes, and the upper classes. Although the coefficients on the Director variable in specification two of Table 8 is negative on both occasions, only one coefficient is statistically significant, and it is only at the 10 percent level. This suggests that railway directors were no more likely to be losers rather than gainers. However, railway chairmen were significantly less likely to be losers, providing mixed results for the overall position of railway insiders.
From both panels of Table 8 we see that investors from Lancashire and local shareholders were more likely to be gainers rather than losers. This may suggest a level of investment astuteness on the part of shareholders from Lancashire and superior information on the part of local investors. We also see that GWR investors who also invested in one of the new railway schemes were more likely to be gainers rather than losers. This might be because such investors sold their GWR stake to invest in new railways or it could indicate that GWR investors who invested in new railways were more experienced investors.
Conclusions
The anecdotal evidence for the Railway Mania does not deviate from the stereotypical view that investors during asset price booms are inexperienced and naive.
However, our findings suggest that it would be an error to suggest that the Mania was driven by such investors. Using a range of measures, we find evidence that many investors were highly experienced. Although we do not directly address the issue of whether the Railway Mania was a financial "bubble," our findings do not coalesce well with an interpretation of the Mania that argues that substantial investments by naive investors contributed to the asset price boom and bust.
One potential explanation of the Mania is that inexperienced investors were expropriated by railway insiders. Although we find evidence that investors with less experience tended to earn lower returns on their investments in new projects and were more likely to lose money during the downturn, we find no evidence to suggest that they were expropriated by railway insiders. Indeed, despite their access to power and insider knowledge, the investments of railway insiders performed no better than those made by the business and middle classes. This evidence appears to partially absolve these vested interests from acting in an opportunistic fashion during the Mania.
All of this evidence raises a puzzle: why did so many people invest in railway shares given that they turned out to be a poor investment ex post? One possibility is that there were insufficient outlets for a growing amount of savings, as the National Debt was not growing and there were few alternative investment assets. Although this may have determined stock returns in the long run, it is unlikely to have caused the sharp reversal in railway stock prices in the mid-1840s. Another possibility is that investors were simply riding the "bubble," and hoping to get out before its eventual demise or before they had to pay calls on capital. Another possible explanation could be that investors at the time were unaware that they were living through a period where new technology was being rapidly adopted, and as the probability of adoption increased, the rate at which cash flows were discounted increased, thus causing stock prices to fall. 67 Notably, other famous "bubble" episodes such as the 1825 bubble in Britain, the U.S. case of 1928-29, and the dotcom episode of the 1990s have all been associated with concentrated investment in new investment opportunities. 68 Another potential explanation is that there was political failure in that the UK Parliament, particularly in the autumn of 1845, did not ration railway schemes, and thus prevent wasteful competition. 69 The effect of this political failure may have been to lower future cash flows, and hence railway stock prices. Future research should attempt to test these various explanations.
The collapse of railway shares in the late 1840s resulted in great difficulties for railway companies who needed capital to expand and improve their network. Investors were generally reluctant to fund smaller railways, and even larger entities had to innovate by issuing preferred stock and debentures to raise the necessary capital. By the early 1860s, the companies that were successful at doing this were producing the earnings that had been anticipated by investors in the 1840s, but even this was temporary, with railway profitability declining from the 1870s onwards. 70 Consequently, a further area of research is the extent to which the Railway Mania affected the subsequent financing and development of British railways. 36 Broadbridge, "Sources of Railway Share Capital", 193. 37 Pollins, "Marketing of Railway Shares", 238. On the absence of favouritism in the allotment of railway shares see The Railway Shareholder's Pocket-book and Almanac (London, 1846), 56. 38 Broadbridge, "Sources of Railway Share Capital", 194. 39 Anon., The Railway Investment Guide, 9. 40 Pollins, Britain's Railways, 37. 41 Although we are not looking at trading per se, we are implicitly using the concepts of information and noise traders as articulated by Fischer Black. See Fischer Black, "Noise" Journal of Finance 41 (1986): 529-43. In Black"s model, some information traders will lose money and some noise traders will make money, but noise traders as a group will lose money and information traders as a group will make money.
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42 "Agriculture" includes farmer, cattle and corn dealers, yeomen, millers etc.; "Bankers" include bank directors, managers, senior officials as well as private bankers; "Other finance" includes accountants, actuaries, and insurance brokers / agents; "Legal professionals" includes advocates, barristers, solicitors, and writers to the signet; "Manufacturers" are those whose main business is manufacturing; "Merchants" include those described as merchants as well as brokers, dealers, agents, printers, publishers, and shipowners; "Nobility" includes peers as well baronets and knights; "Politicians" is mainly composed of MPs, but there are also a few mayors and aldermen included in this category; "Professionals" includes architects, company secretaries, dentists, doctors, engineers, senior civil servants, and surgeons; "Retailers" are those who retail goods or provide services via shops to the general public; "Skilled working class" includes tradesmen and occupations which required some degree of education / training; "Unskilled working class" Notes: Investors who invested in both the runup and the peak refers to those investors who appeared on subscription lists in both 1845 and 1846. The top percentile of investors refers to the top one percent of investors when they are ranked according to the total amount which they invested during the Mania. Dividend rates for the Great Western Railway were obtained from the Course of the Exchange.
Notes: The market indices are weighted by market capitalisation. Great Western share price data is based on their £100 shares. Capital gains indices only include the returns from share price movements, controlling for changes in capital due to the effect of calls. Total return index also includes the returns from dividend payments in the week that they changed, according to the Course of the Exchange.
Sources for Panel B:
The indices are calculated from daily stock price data in the Railway Times (1843-50).
Notes: Logarithmic scale. Market index of established railway companies weights the capital gains of companies established prior to the Mania (i.e., before 1843) according to market capitalisation. Market indices of new railway companies weights the capital gains of new railway companies, projected after 1843, assuming that investors rebalanced their portfolios each week to include all new railway companies according to their market capitalisation if they were already listed on the secondary market prior to that week, and according to their par value if they had not been previously listed on the market. The first-day return is calculated as the return to an investor when an asset is first traded on the market, if the investor had subscribed to the asset in the primary market at its par value. New railway indices begin in January 1844 when the first new railway company was listed on the market. All indices have a base of 1,000 in January 1844. 
